Comparative Analysis of U.S. and Saudi Arabia Investment Funds Regulations by Tang, Gabriella
Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business 
Volume 41 
Issue 1 Fall Article 4 
Fall 2020 
Comparative Analysis of U.S. and Saudi Arabia Investment Funds 
Regulations 
Gabriella Tang 
Northwestern University Pritzker School of Law, gabriellatang2021@nlaw.northwestern.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/njilb 
 Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons, Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, and the 
Securities Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Gabriella Tang, Comparative Analysis of U.S. and Saudi Arabia Investment Funds Regulations, 41 NW. J. 
INT'L L. & BUS. 116 (2020). 
https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/njilb/vol41/iss1/4 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern Pritzker School of Law Scholarly 
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business by an 
authorized editor of Northwestern Pritzker School of Law Scholarly Commons. 
Comparative Analysis of U.S. and Saudi Arabia Investment Funds Regulations 
Cover Page Footnote 
I want to express my sincere gratitude to Professor Paul Dykstra and Professor Paulita Pike for sparking 
my interest in this topic and Professor John O’Hare for his thoughtful guidance. Special thanks to my 
fellow editors on the Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business for their meticulous edits. I 
am grateful to my parents, Simon and Lucy, and lastly, to my cat, Amar. All errors are my own. 
This comment is available in Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business: 
https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/njilb/vol41/iss1/4 
Copyright 2021 by Gabriella Tang Vol. 41, No. 1 




Comparative Analysis of U.S. and 



















 1 I want to express my sincere gratitude to Professor Paul Dykstra and Professor Paulita 
Pike for sparking my interest in this topic and Professor John O’Hare for his thoughtful 
guidance. Special thanks to my fellow editors on the Northwestern Journal of International 
Law and Business for their meticulous edits. I am grateful to my parents, Simon and Lucy, 
and lastly, to my cat, Amar. All errors are my own. 
Northwestern Journal of 








The investment funds sector has always been a major player in the financial 
industry globally. As such, many countries with mature financial markets have 
enacted regulations to govern the activity and management of investment funds. 
The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) enacted the Investment 
Company Act of 1940(the Act) as an effort to restore investor confidence in 
investment funds and safeguard investors from future abuses after the market 
crash in 1929.2 On the other hand, emerging financial markets started to take 
part in regulations in the hope to attract more investors and outside resources. 
The Capital Market Authority of Saudi Arabia (hereinafter CMA) enacted the 
Investment Funds Regulation (hereinafter the Regulation) in 2006, as the 
Sovereign aims to turn the State into an investment powerhouse.3 Due to the 
newness of the Regulation, an analysis of the Act will be helpful for the CMA to 
improvise the Regulation and avoid mistakes. 
This paper will first focus on four areas of the Investment Company Act of 1940, 
analyzing the strengths and weaknesses of the Act with suggestions provided. It 
will then offer an analysis of the Investment Funds Regulation of Saudi Arabia 
and discuss areas for improvement based on the analysis of the Investment 
















 2 See Walter P. North, A Brief History of Federal Investment Company Legislation, 44 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 677, 681-82 (1969). 
 3 See Message from HRH Prince Mohammed Bin Salman Bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud, 
VISION 2030 KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA, https://vision2030.gov.sa/en/vision/crown-
message (last visited Feb. 01, 2020). 
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I. INTRODUCTION-HISTORY OF THE INVESTMENT COMPANY 
ACT OF 1940 
The Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
represented the beginning of federal securities regulation. They are still the 
basic Acts regulating the purchase, sale, and issuance of securities. These 
Acts protect the public in trading the traditional type of securities, 
commonly referred to those issued by corporations, traded through an 
exchange and over the counter market. However, the proliferation of 
investment companies in the 1930s and the rapid increase in size of such 
companies called for a regulatory scheme at the federal level.4 The market 
crash in 1929 which led to the depression in the 1930s evidenced that there 
were evils and abuses in the operation of investment funds.5 The SEC, in an 
effort to restore investor confidence in investment funds and safeguard 
investors from future abuse, enacted the Investment Company Act of 1940.6 
The Act compels any “investment company” to register under the SEC.7 
Companies registered as such are subject to the full disclosure requirements 
of the Act.8 
Many of the provisions in the Investment Company Act are intended 
to curtail fraud and conflicts of interest. Section 36(a) under the Act 
authorizes the SEC to impose injunctions on investment companies defined 
by the Act. The SEC was unwilling to provide injunctive relief to prevent 
stigmatizing advisors. Due to the existing conflict in the industry of gross 
misconduct and misuse, injunctive relief would create a huge adverse 
impact on the industry. Due to the SEC’s reluctance to bring an action, 
Congress enacted Section 36(b) to authorize shareholders to bring actions 
against persons associated with the fund for matters related to breach of 
fiduciary duty, and lack of independence or compensation for service. 
Congressional intent of the bill may be drawn by tracing congressional 
and legislative records.9 However, summarizing any congressional or 
legislative record is beyond the scope of this article. Despite the noted 
limitation, two aspects of the congressional hearing are worth mentioning: 
 
 4 See  SEC,  DIV. OF INV. MGMT., PROTECTING INVESTORS: A HALF CENTURY OF 
INVESTMENT COMPANY REGULATION, xvii (1992), https://www.sec.gov/divisions/investment/ 
guidance/icreg50-92.pdf. 
 5 U.S. CONG. COMM. ON ENERGY & COMMERCE SUBCOMM. ON TELECOMM., CONSUMER 
PROT., & FIN., 99TH CONG., RESTRUCTURING FINANCIAL MARKETS: THE MAJOR POLICY 
ISSUES: A REPORT 73 (Comm. Print 1986). 
 6 See What We Do, SEC, https://www.sec.gov/Article/whatwedo.html (last modified 
June 10, 2013). 
 7 Id.  
 8 Id. 
 9 Walter P. North, A Brief History of Federal Investment Company Legislation, 44 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 677, 681-82 (1969); See also, Richard H. Farina, John P. Freeman & 
James Webster, The Mutual Fund Industry: A Legal Survey, 44 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 732 
(1969). 
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1. Both the industry and the SEC agree on the issue that a set of 
regulations is necessary to control abuses and evils and restore investor 
confidence in the investment field. 10 
2. The jointly sponsored bill received the endorsement of the SEC and 
the endorsement of the industry. 11 
In fact, given the rarity of a jointly sponsored bill which 
simultaneously represents both the desire of the industry and the SEC to 
regulate investment funds, such an accomplishment was rather 
astonishing.12 Moreover, it is very unusual that the industry was willing to 
subject itself to regulation. The fact that the Act reached industry and 
regulatory consensus represented the very intent to protect public investor 
interest. Subsequent interpretation of the Act or reconciliation of any 
ambiguity presented should thus take this core value into consideration. 
 
II. WHAT IS DEFINED AS AN INVESTMENT COMPANY?13 
In order to become an investment company, the Act requires an entity 
to issue securities.14 In addition to issuing securities, it has to hold and trade 
securities. The Investment Company Act of 1940 outlined a subjective test 
and an objective test to define an investment company. 
The difficulty in defining an investment company lies in making the 
distinction between an operating company and an investment company, the 
latter of which is subject to SEC registration and extensive substantive 
 
 10 Senator Healy mentioned “I have heard but one witness, out of all those who 
appeared here, who went on the witness stand and said that there should be no regulation.” 
Hearing on S. 3580 before a Subcomm. Of the Senate Comm. On Banking and Currency, 
[hereinafter Hearings] 76th Cong., 3d Sess., pt.2, at 1051. 
 11 Hearings, supra note 10, at 1053. 
 12 North, supra note 8, at 684. 
 13 15 U.S.C. § 80a–3 (2020). 
  Definition of Investment Company 
   (a)Definitions 
(1) When used in this subchapter, “investment company“ means any issuer 
which— 
(A) is or holds itself out as being engaged primarily, or proposes to 
engage primarily, in the business of investing, reinvesting, or trading 
in securities; 
(B) is engaged or proposes to engage in the business of issuing face- 
amount certificates of the installment type, or has been engaged in such 
business and has any such certificate outstanding; or 
(C) is engaged or proposes to engage in the business of investing, 
reinvesting, owning, holding, or trading in securities, and owns or 
proposes to acquire investment securities having a value exceeding 40 
percentum of the value of such issuer’s total assets (exclusive of 
Government securities and cash items) on an unconsolidated basis. 
 14 Id. 
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regulations. An operating company is defined as a parent corporation 
possessing enough voting stock of another company or a subsidiary. The 
operating company maintains control over the subsidiary’s course of 
business and oversees its management decisions. 
On the other hand, an investment company is one that conducts its 
business solely on investing its pool of money in diversified securities. 
The subjective test, Section 3(a)(1)(A), holds that “any issuer which is 
or holds itself out as being engaged primarily, or proposes to engage 
primarily, in the business of investing, reinvesting, or trading securities.”15 
This definition is rather simple; if an entity holds or represents itself to the 
public as a company, solely conducts investment business, then such entity 
falls under the investment company definition.16 
The objective test, Section 3(a)(1)(C) holds that the entity “is engaged 
or proposes to engage in the business of investing, reinvesting, owning, 
holding, or trading in securities, and owns or proposes to acquire 
investment securities having a value exceeding 40 per centum of the value 
of such issuer’s total assets (exclusive of Government securities and cash 
items) on an unconsolidated basis.”17 In this statistical requirement, if an 
entity has over 40% of its assets in securities, then it shall be labeled as an 
investment company. 
Notwithstanding the subjective and objective test, no company is an 
investment company if it (1) is primarily engaged, directly or through a 
wholly owned subsidiary or subsidiaries, in a business or businesses other 
than that of investing, reinvesting, owning, holding, or trading in securities; 
(2) declares to be primarily engaged in a business other than that of 
investing, reinvesting, owning, holding, or trading in securities either 
directly or (a) through majority owned subsidiaries or (b) through 
controlled companies conducting similar types of business; or (3) is a 
company all of the outstanding securities of which are directly or indirectly 
owned by a company excepted from the definition of investment company 
by (1) or (2) above. Any entities that fall under these categories will be 
considered an operating company. 
However, private funds avoid painful restrictions by forming the fund 
to qualify for an exception from being considered an investment company. 
Private funds like venture capital funds, hedge funds, and private equity 
funds generally rely on exemptions under Section 3(c)(1) and Section 
3(c)(7). In fact, ensuring the fund falls under these two exemptions is the 
most important first step for a new private fund. Avoiding investment 




 15 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(a)(1)(a). 
 16 See SEC v. Presto Telecomm., Inc., 237 F. App’x. 198 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 17 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(a)(1)(c). 




Under Section 3(c)(1), a company that has outstanding securities 
beneficially owned by less than 100 persons and is not making or planning 
to make a public offering of its securities will be excluded from the 
definition of an investment company under the Act. This provision is 
rational and represents the core value of the Investment Company Act of 
1940. 
Congress enacted the Act with the intention to provide extensive 
protection to investors investing in mutual funds after the 1930 market 
crash.18 The Act was designed to mitigate and eliminate the condition that 
adversely affects investors’ interests and public national interests as a 
whole.19 If an entity qualifies to be an investment company, then it is 
subjected to subsequent requirements that are intended to offer protection to 
investors. 
It may seem odd at first glance. Companies that satisfy this exemption 
still have investors. Even though the investor pool is small, these investors 
still fall under the investor definition provided by the Act. By offering such 
an exemption, the Act seems to oddly exclude these investors from 
protections. However, when the investor pool is small such that there are 
only 100 or fewer investors, these investors have better access and control 
over the fund and the investment manager. 
Comparatively, when a fund has numerous shareholders spreading 
across the country or even the world, it is already burdensome to gather 
proxies from all shareholders, not to mention the fact that they will need to 
unite together to exert influence on the fund manager. With less than 100 
beneficial owners, investors could easily act jointly to maximize their 
benefits. Self-help in this instance is adequate to protect these investors 
from the abuses and evils the Act was designed to prevent.20 
The Act provides that beneficial ownership by a company would 
generally be counted as one person. Under this provision, if a public 
investment company, with a large number of shareholders, holds a certain 
amount of securities in a Section 3(c)(1) fund, the company as a whole will 
be considered as one beneficial owner of that Section 3(c)(1) fund. 
Some offshore funds may try to utilize this exemption to circumvent 
 
 18 See North, supra note 8. 
 19 Id. at 680. 
 20 “The major abuses which have caused these [investment companies] to fall into 
disrepute may be grouped as follows: 
  (1) Removal of funds from control of those who supply them, 
  (2) Conflicting interests of management, 
  (3) Pyramiding, 
  (4) Excessive management charges and hidden fees, and 
  (5) Management’s use of control.” 
Richard B. Tolins, Investment Company Act of 1940, 26 CORNELL L. REV. 77, 83 (1940). 
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the 1940 Act. Imagine this scenario: a few investment companies, trying to 
evade Investment Company requirements and involvement in investment 
strategies and structure that are prohibited by the Act, jointly created a 
wholly owned subsidiary fund. This fund then comprises only a handful of 
beneficial owners, and each of these “owners” owns a large percentage of 
the fund along with a variety of other securities in their portfolios. This, at 
first glance, seems permissible under the Act. Thus, the fund is exempted 
from the investment company requirements. However, these beneficial 
owners are investment companies with shareholders that the Act aims to 
protect. Prohibiting those investment strategies and structures were 
essential for the success of the protection. The Act limited leverage 
investing, for example, to mitigate the adverse effect during a market 
downturn. If investment companies are able to dodge the radar of the Act, 
shareholders’ interests will be left unprotected. This runs afoul of the core 
value and the original intention of the enactment of the Investment 
Company Act of 1940.21 
The Act provided a solution to prevent circumvention. In Section 
3(c)(1)(A), the Act provided an Attribution Rule. Under this rule, if an 
investment company owns more than ten percent of the securities in a 
3(c)(1) fund, the number of this investment company’s shareholders will be 
attributed to the number of shareholders of a Section 3(c)(1) fund. That 
being said, if these investment companies were to jointly create a fund to 
qualify for 3(c)(1) exemption, they need to ensure, aggregately, their 
shareholder number will not exceed 100. The enactment of the Attrition 
Rule further guaranteed public shareholder interest. It not only prevents 
collusion among investment companies, but also prohibits investment 
activities that could reinforce a market crash. 
Section 3(c)(7) 
Other than Section 3(c)(1), private funds could also get an exemption 
from Section 3(c)(7). This exemption permits a private fund to have an 
unlimited number of investors provided that the securities are (1) owned 
exclusively by qualified purchasers and (2) not and will not be subjected to 
public offering. Under Section 2(a)(51)(A), qualified purchasers are persons 
who own at least $5 million in investments.22 The reasoning for this 
 
 21 Hearings, supra note 10, at 1050. 
 22 Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C.A. § 80-2(a)(51)(A) (2006). This section 
defines a “qualified purchaser” as: 
I. [A]ny natural person who owns not less than $5,000,000 in investments, as defined 
by the Commission; 
II. [A]ny company that owns not less than $5,000,000 in investments and that is 
owned directly or indirectly by or for 2 or more natural persons who are related as 
siblings or spouse (including former spouses), or direct lineal descendants by birth 
or adoption, spouses of such persons, the estate of such persons, or foundations, 
charitable organizations, or trusts established by or for the benefit of such persons; 
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exemption is rational: people with $5 million or more in assets are wealthy 
and sophisticated investors. They are not in need of the protection offered 
by the Act. Wealthy individuals considered under the Act often possess the 
knowledge of investment and are willing to appreciate a more risky 
investment for a more sizable return. Even if they suffer a loss through a 
risky investment, they will have sufficient financial means to hedge against 
the loss. Further, they will often have access to financial and legal advisors. 
They are able to protect their interest and exert influence over the fund in 
the event of abuses and evils. In fact, the protection they hold may even be 
more effective than those provided by the Act. 
Restriction on Borrowing and Senior Securities 
Section 18 of the Act strictly limits open-end investment companies 
from issuing multiple classes of shares. Some scholars have argued for a 
more relaxed regulation on issuing senior securities and borrowing so as to 
offer investors more options, tailoring to their risk-comfort level.23 
However, this section will argue that the restriction on borrowing and 
leverage investing has been effective. The provision offers great flexibilities 
for the SEC to make amendments incorporating modern investment trends 
without compromising investors’ economic interests. 
To address the effectiveness of the provision, one has to first consider 
the characteristics of open-end funds. Open-end funds, unlike closed-end 
funds, offer redeemable securities. There is no limitation on the growth of 
the fund, investors can easily opt-in and opt-out by redeeming their shares 
at any time. An open-end fund cannot refuse redemption and must provide 
cash payment to shareholders when requested. 
 
Section 18(f) 
Section 18(f) restricts leveraged capital structures which are usually 
achieved by borrowing or issuing preferred stock. As a result, an open-end 
fund cannot issue senior securities.24 A fund may, however, borrow from 
banks if it maintains a 300% asset coverage for all such borrowings. 
First, Congress did not impose an absolute prohibition on leverage 
 
  III. [A]ny trust that is not covered by clause (II) and that was not formed for the 
specific purpose of acquiring the securities offered, as to which the trustee or 
other person authorized to make decisions with respect to the trust, and each 
settlor or other person who has contributed assets to the trust, is a person 
described in clause (I), (II), or (IV); or 
  IV. [A]ny person, acting for its own account or the accounts of other qualified 
purchasers, who in the aggregate owns and invests on a discretionary basis, not 
less than $25,000,000 in investments. 
 23 John Morley, The Regulation of Mutual Fund Debt, 30 YALE J. ON REG. 343, 344-45 
(2013). 
 24 A senior security is a type of security that ranks as more superior in terms of payout. 
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investing. In fact, it permits leverage investing with well-defined limits. 
Initially, the SEC developed a broad concept for “senior securities” that 
included any kind of indebtedness. Over the years, the SEC has permitted 
trading of derivatives, so long as the fund has equivalent stock in its 
portfolio or high liquid securities in a segregated account to fulfill its 
obligations incurred from derivatives transactions. The segregated account 
freezes certain liquid assets of the fund, rendering them unavailable for 
sale. These assets are marked to the market daily, thus allowing the fund to 
constantly monitor its coverage level and maintain proper risk level. This 
account functions as a limit on the amount of leverage which the investment 
company may undertake.25 The result of having this segregated account is 
that the fund can achieve leverage through a derivatives transaction without 
creating senior securities. 
In general, a fund would want to involve leverage investing to take 
advantage of the favorable market or borrow to obtain liquidity for 
redemption. While a fund may sell its assets to increase liquidity, this 
process generally takes more than a few days. A bank can provide adequate 
liquidity in less than two days. However, when an open-end fund borrows, 
its assets may decrease while the value of the loan stays intact. In order for 
the fund to have the liquidity to meet the portfolio coverage in case of an 
influx of shareholder redemption, a fund may need to sell securities during 
a declining market. In that sense, the fund not only suffers exacerbated loss 
from leverage investing in a declining market, it is also forced to sell assets 
at lower value. This destroys investor confidence and thus leads to more 
redemption, leading to more liquidity needs and creating a vicious cycle. 
Moreover, leverage investing increases the volatility of the common 
shareholder’s investment. Senior securities created by leverage investing 
magnify losses suffered by the common shareholder during economic 
downturns. These shareholders not only suffer share value shrinkage, but 
are also punished for assuming more risk in their investment due to this 
inferior capital structure. During fund liquidation, where senior securities 
receive priority payouts, junior capitals run the risk of losing even their 
principal payments. The heavy restriction is thus effective in preventing 
huge losses and further represents Congress’s attempt to restore public 
confidence in mutual funds after the market crash in 1929. 
III. INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS REQUIREMENT 
One of the major provisions in the Act is the requirement for 
independent directors. Under the Act, the board of a mutual fund must 
contain a minimum percentage of independent directors. Furthermore, the 
Act outlines very detailed criteria in determining the independence of an 
independent director. This provision is distinctive in that no other federal 
 
 25 TAMAR FRANKEL & KENNETH E. BURDON, INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT REGULATION 
283-84 (5th ed. 2015). 
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statutes mandate a minimum requirement on independent directors. 
This provision seems logical at first, considering the large number of 
dollars at stake.26 According to research conducted by the ICA, registered 
investment companies manage twenty-one percent of household financial 
assets in the United States.27 Before the enactment of the Act, absent an 
independent director requirement, directors were usually affiliates selected 
by fund advisers. As such, these directors tended to vote in favor of the 
advisers in board meetings, providing advisers the chance to use fund assets 
to advance their own financial interests at the expense of the shareholders. 
Thus, independent directors are necessary to prevent advisers from abusing 
their positions and to ensure public economic interest. 
Under present law, a mutual fund board must have no less than forty 
percent of directors that are “disinterested” persons in the company. A 
director is an interested person in the company if: that director is inter alia 
affiliated with the company, its investment advisor, or its principal 
underwriter; has acted as, been employed by, or partnered with legal 
counsel for the company in the preceding six months; has loaned money or 
property to the company or its adviser’s accounts in the preceding six 
months; or is within the “immediate” family of a person who is affiliated 
with the company.28 Additionally, an independent director of an investment 
company cannot have a material business or professional relationship with 
the investment companies, its investment adviser, or its principal 
underwriter, or have been a partner or employee of a person who has done 
so, within the past two fiscal years.29 In simple words, independent 
directors cannot own a single share of the investments or business of the 
investment adviser. This concept passes through to sub-advisers. 
Everything that relates to an investment adviser will relate to sub-advisers. 
While this provision protects investors’ financial interests and fends 
off potential abuse, it is both overinclusive and underinclusive. 
Underinclusive 
Congress’s rationale when drafting this provision was that directors 
 
 26 “The net asset for all U.S. investment companies amounted to $21.4 trillion by the 
end of 2018.” INVESTMENT INV. CO. INST., 2005 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK 32 (59th 
ed. 2019), https://www.ici.org/pdf/2019_factbook.pdf. 
 27 Id. at 34. 
 28 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(19)(A)(i)—(vi) (2000); see 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(3) (Defining an 
‘affiliated person’ as “(A) any person directly or indirectly owning, controlling, or holding 
with power to vote, 5 per centum or more of the outstanding voting securities of such other 
person; (B) any person 5 per centum or more of whose outstanding voting securities are 
directly or indirectly owned, controlled, or held with power to vote, by such other person; 
(C) any person directly or indirectly controlling, controlled by, or under common control 
with, such other person; (D) any officer, director, partner, copartner, or employee of such 
other person”). 
 29 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(19)(A)(vii). 
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who are not interested persons pose less risk of conflicts of interest. Thus, 
these directors strengthen independent checks on the management board 
and its investment decisions. Congress and the SEC, on multiple occasions, 
concluded that a relationship is material if it influences the director to act in 
a manner that advances interests other than those of the shareholders. House 
committee reports declaring “substantial financial . . . relationships”30 
further confirmed Congress’s belief that a material relationship is 
characterized by monetary elements. However, self-interest often lacks 
direct financial motives. Relationships may not be driven purely by 
pecuniary incentive, but nonetheless lead one to fame or business 
connections which, in turn, result in advancements in other facets. 
People tend to make numerous business connections through 
participation in clubs. Under the current law and Congress’s interpretation 
on materiality, such business connections do not raise the matter of 
interestedness. However, people who are able to join luxury sport clubs are 
often successful, wealthy business individuals. Money may not be the most 
important element in their career pursuits. Participating in the decision-
making of an investment company allows them to secure more societal 
influence and increase their prestige. While the lack of monetary affiliation 
between the director and the adviser may allow the director to be 
independent in his judgment, there remains the risk of potential abuse. 
A director may be more prone to side with the investment adviser in 
board decisions because of the established relationship, maintenance of that 
connection, or the desire to be recommended by the adviser for future, 
unrelated business opportunities. Further, a ‘golf buddy’ would not have 
been invited by the adviser to take a board seat if that individual’s vision 
did not align with that of the adviser. 
The Act requires independent directors to select other independent 
directors; however, the advisers select the group of independent directors 
when the fund is initially formed. Thus, subsequent independent directors 
selected by ‘golf buddies’ of the adviser are not entirely independent. One 
may argue, due to criticism of ‘invite your dentist,’ that independent boards 
are more often filled with business school faculties in modern days.31 
However, an occasional celebrity figure or sports legend could still end up 
in a board seat.32 While celebrities or sport legends may know nothing 
about the financial industry, academics often lack practical business 
experience and tend to err on the side of being too theoretical in their 
decisions. Excessive theoretical understanding of the industry will likely 
lead to impracticality and, in the end, impair the interests of the fund. 
 
 30 Investment Company Amendments Act of 1970, H.R. 91-1382, 91st Cong., at 13 
(1970). 
 31 James Sterngold, Why Mutual Fund Guardians are Failing, WALL ST. J. (June 14, 
2012, 5:11 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB7000142405270230381540457733625153
4419564. 
 32 Id. 




Under the statutory language, an interested person is one who has 
executed any transaction with the investment company or the adviser of 
interest in the investment company.33 Further, institutional investors that 
own 5% or more of a fund are affiliated parties, and the Act prohibits 
transaction with such affiliates. Thus, a person is interested if he or she has 
transacted with an affiliate. 
Before the statute’s enactment, advisers were involved in larceny and 
embezzlement, while directors were reinforcing the misconduct due to their 
personal and financial ties with the advisers.34 The SEC was unwilling to 
issue injunctive relief out of concern that it would stigmatize investment 
company advisers.35 Due to the lack of action from the SEC, Congress 
implemented the independent director rule and interested person standard to 
ensure director independence and to thwart potential conflicts of interest.36 
While this rule was effective in safeguarding shareholders’ interests at the 
point of enactment, the rule needs to be updated to encompass modern 
investment trends. 
The interested person standard did not anticipate the emergence of 
fund families. Since this standard applies to sub-advisers, an independent 
director for a fund group that has 100 funds, which each has 50 sub-
advisers, cannot have any economic interest with the advisers of those 100 
funds or the 5000 sub-advisers. Consider mega-fund managers like The 
Blackstone Group. If it were to become a sub-adviser of Allstate Insurance, 
Blackstone may encounter a list of thousands of potential affiliates. If 
Allstate needs to elect an independent director for one of its investment 
funds, its selections will be very limited due to the large list of affiliates. 
It is inevitable that funds as large as The Blackstone Group have a 
broad network and do business in every industry. The complex nature of 
these funds’ transactions also requires investment decisions informed by 
knowledgeable business experts. Typically, individuals with specialized 
expertise have extensive business and financial connections. An 
individual’s economic interests with the advisers/sub-advisers may be only 
one investment in his or her diverse portfolio. This business connection 
may not even amount to a material level with respect to the individual’s 
whole investment profile. Crossovers and overlaps are inevitable when the 
financial industry is so interconnected. Under the current standard, a 
negligible economic interest in the adviser’s or sub-adviser’s business leads 
to a conclusion of lack of independence and impaired judgment. While the 
fund may seek exemption from the SEC, filing for an exemption is usually 
 
 33 15 U.S.C. § 80a–2(a)(19)(A)(v). 
 34 North, supra note 8, at 678; Walter Werner, Protecting the Mutual Fund Investor: 
The SEC Reports on the SEC, COLUMBIA L. REV. 1, 4 (1968). 
 35 H.R. Rep. No. 2337, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. at 142-43 (1966). 
 36 North, supra note 8, at 678; Werner, supra note 32, at 7. 
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a time-consuming process. 
The existence of such a strict standard deters potential candidates from 
taking board seats in fear of jeopardizing their own business interests or 
violating SEC regulations. 
 
Recommendations 
The independent director rule permits “friends” of the advisers to be 
elected while prohibiting individuals with negligible business interests from 
taking positions. In order to mitigate the risk of including one’s ‘golf 
buddies’ and impairing board decisions, the SEC should prohibit some 
relationships not driven purely by pecuniary interest and expand materiality 
to include relationships that lead to self-serving goals at the expense of 
shareholders’ interests. 
Consider Delaware’s statute governing interested directors, under 
which transactions are not void if the company can provide full disclosure 
and obtain good faith authorization from shareholders.37 Similarly, full 
disclosure and shareholder ratification could cleanse any taint of conflicting 
interest from a potential ‘golf buddy’ candidate. 
One may argue shareholder ratification is costly; however, shareholder 
ratification may not always be exercised. Such a measure only provides 
shareholders the right to exercise if they are concerned about a ‘golf buddy’ 
relationship after full disclosure. The shareholders could, in holding with 
requirements under Rule 14a-8,38 request a shareholder vote before the 
candidate assumes office. While Rule 14a-8(i)(8) allows a company to omit 
a shareholder proposal if it relates to the election of officers, shareholder 
requests regarding the election of independent directors should be exempted 
from Rule 14a-8(i)(8). One may also argue that, given the redeemable 
nature of a mutual fund, a shareholder could simply redeem the shares and 
abandon his or her stake due to concern about a director; such shareholders 
would not exercise their ratification rights. However, a shareholder 
ratification provision could function as a psychological barrier to directors 
that intimidates those non-pecuniary but interested relationships mentioned 
above. This ratification process also thwarts future shareholder litigation 
concerning an interested director. 
When available, shareholder ratification, or the lack of a proposal for 
ratification, demonstrates that the election of the individual was in the 
interest of a majority of shareholders. 
 
 37 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a)(2) (2006) (Stating that “[t]he material facts as to the 
director’s or officer’s relationship or interest and as to the contract or transaction are 
disclosed or are known to the stockholders entitled to vote thereon, and the contract or 
transaction is specifically approved in good faith by vote of the stockholders[.]”). 
 38 17 CFR § 240.14a-8. (Hereinafter “Rule 14a-8”). 
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IV. DE MINIMIS FACTOR TEST 
In addition, the SEC should impose a de minimis standard to Section 
2(a)(19) to address the overinclusive problem which unnecessarily 
disqualifies individuals from serving as independent directors. This section 
proposes the adoption of a factor test to determine the independence of a 
potential candidate who has economic interest with the adviser or sub-
adviser. Under such a standard, independent directors and the board would 
be provided business judgment rule protection if they can provide well-
reasoned justification and evidence for each factor when determining the 
directors’ independence. 
A director who has economic interests with an adviser or sub-adviser 
should still be considered independent given: 
i) the beneficial interest the potential candidate owns is immaterial in 
relation to the entire portfolio; such immateriality should be a subjective 
judgment with respect to the potential independent director. 
The prohibition on material and beneficial relationships arises from the 
concern of judgment impaired by such relationship. However, if the 
beneficial interests do not appear material from the candidates’ 
perspectives, their judgments are unlikely to be impaired based on the 
interests they have with the advisers. Coming up with a numerical percent 
is outside the scope of this paper. However, potential candidates must be 
able to demonstrate that the concerned beneficial interests constitute a 
minor portion of their total assets. 
ii) the potential director’s economic interest with the adviser/sub-
adviser is minor when compared to the whole company’s (company of the 
adviser or sub-adviser) interest. 
The question posed when measuring this factor is whether the 
potential director’s ownership of the adviser’s or sub-adviser’s company is 
material with respect to the company as a whole. In this case, materiality 
can be interpreted both from a subjective and objective standard. 
Subjectively, the company should not view the director’s economic interest 
in the company as material compared to the rest of the shareholders. 
Objectively, the economic interest that a potential director has in the 
company should be minor, such that substantial economic gain cannot be 
derived from that particular interest by favoring the adviser in business 
judgments as a director. 
iii) attenuation of the economic interest. 
Currently, if a partner in the Hong Kong office of a law firm had acted 
as a legal adviser for the adviser in the prior year, a partner in the New 
York office of the same law firm would be disqualified from serving as an 
independent director. This standard holds even if the New York partner has 
never encountered the Hong Kong partner and has no knowledge of the 
previous advisory relationship. However, this type of attenuated interest is 
not the type of interest that Congress intended to prohibit when it adopted 
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the provision. If the interest is attenuated such that it does not rise to 
materiality with respect to the potential candidate, it is unlikely that 
judgment will be impaired. 
iv) level of happenstance of the economic interest given the nature of 
the potential candidate’s investment strategies. 
If investing in a diverse set of securities is the potential independent 
director’s ordinary course of investment, it is likely that an economic 
interest with the adviser is merely incidental to the director’s portfolio 
investment strategy. 
No factor shall be considered more important than the others. In fact, 
all factors should be considered interconnected. For example, factor (iv) 
alone cannot determine the independence of a director without considering 
the substantive impact of factors (i) and (ii). 
Because this proposal substantively relaxes the current standard, one 
may worry that it could lead to abuses akin to those prior to the enactment 
of the Act. However, mutual funds are registered companies under state 
law. As such, the independent board is governed by fiduciary duties under 
state corporate law. Corporate fiduciary duties require the independent 
board to exercise diligence in its judgments. As such, a potential candidate 
must provide reasonable justifications backed by evidence for each factor. 
The independent board, bound by corporate fiduciary duties, then 
scrutinizes the justifications and exercises its best judgment in voting. 
12b-1 fee; Maybe it is time to end it 
In 1980, the SEC adopted rule 12b-1 to permit open-end management 
investment companies to bear expenses associated with the distribution of 
their shares.39 Rule 12b-1 thus passes certain selling costs to shareholders 
through charges against fund assets.40 This creates a conflict of interest: 
managements are allowed to pass costs that benefit themselves to 
shareholders who receive no gain from the process. 
The SEC initially implemented a 12b-1 fee to encourage sales and 
stimulate fund asset growth, benefiting both shareholders and management. 
As the fund grows larger, the lower the operating cost is for a fund, thus 
achieving economy of scale. For example, if fund assets grow larger, the 
fund possesses more negotiation power to reduce the percentage of 
management fee paid to the management. Meanwhile, with the percentage 
fall on the management fee, shareholders will be able to realize a larger 
percentage of return. This sounds like a double win situation. Yet after 
many years of implementing the rule, there is no appearance of a double 
win.41 Rule 12b-1 failed to generate positive financial benefit to fund 
 
 39 Bearing of Distribution Expenses by Mutual Funds, Investment Company Act Rel. 
No. 11414 (Oct. 28, 1980), 45 Fed. Reg. 73898 (Nov. 7, 1980). 
 40 Id. 
 41 Id. 
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shareholders. Moreover, it did not reduce expenses the way the SEC 
expected when it drafted the provision. 
A study conducted by the SEC compared funds of similar size with 
and without 12b-1 plans. It showed that the average expense ratio for 12b-1 
funds is higher than that of non-12b-1 funds.42 In other words, 12b-1 fees 
did not reduce fund expenses, even after subtracting the 12b-1 fees from 
total expense. Further, the study found that both 12b-1 and non-12b-1 funds 
exhibit economies of scale in expenses, but the scale is not produced by a 
lower 12b-1 fee. In fact, the 12b-1 fee changes minimally as the fund grows 
larger. 
A possible explanation for this failure could be attributed to the long-
term impact of a fee. Long-term investors may be less drawn to a 12b-1 
fund that “permits existing shareholders to pay for bringing new 
shareholders into the fund.”43 One may argue that the growth induced by a 
12b-1 fee can generate economies of scale and thus offset the 12b-1 fee.44 
However, it is unlikely that a fund may grow to the size needed in order to 
achieve economies of scale in a short period of time. In fact, it would take 
an equity fund 62 years to generate a sufficient scale of economies to offset 
the 12b-1 fee.45 Given a shareholder does not retain their capital in a single 
fund for such a long period, the scale generated by a 12b-1 fee does not 
provide the shareholder any significant financial benefit. 
Ironically, non-12b-1 funds have also experienced positive annual 
growth of approximately 4%, comparable to the 4% additional growth 
attained by 12b-1 funds.46 If a fund is able to attain similar growth without 
implementing the fee, it would generate fewer expenses and thus higher 
equity per share. Shareholders may be better off in a non-12b-1 fund. 
As technology advances, investors are becoming more comfortable 
with online platforms. With the increase in financial information 
transparency and the ease to access analysis online, the role of the broker is 
becoming less prominent. Modern investors intending to invest in funds 
would not search for “the best broker” in a search engine. In fact, fund 
characteristics and objectives are apparent with a few simple clicks on the 
internet. Investors are able to make decisions according to their investment 
preferences with the available information online. They are able to enroll in 
a mutual fund without any outside assistance. 
Unlike when 12b-1 was enacted, a modern-day broker is not bringing 
in as many new assets to a fund. With the reduced need for a broker to 
 
 42 LORI WALSH, THE COSTS AND BENEFITS TO FUND SHAREHOLDERS OF 12B-1 PLANS: AN 
EXAMINATION OF FUND FLOWS, EXPENSES AND RETURNS, 12 (2004). 
 43 Flanagan, Ronald Kindschi & Spectrum Admin., Inc., SEC Release No. 29-315, 71 
SEC Docket 1415, 1417 (Jan. 31, 2000). 
 44 Walsh, supra note 41, at 12. 
 45 Id. 
 46 Id. 
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expand the fund, a 12b-1 fee seems rather dispensable. In all, 12b-1 fees 
should be eliminated. 
V. SAUDI ARABIA INVESTMENT FUNDS REGULATION 
The History 
Investment funds initially started in commercial banks in most Islamic 
countries. However, such funds did not receive much enthusiasm from 
investors. Muslim investors fear that participation in such funds runs the 
risk of violating Sharia Law, which prohibits trading with interest or 
investment in alcohol, gambling, etc. With the establishment of Sharia 
supervisory boards to certify Islamic financial products as being Sharia 
compliant, Sharia compliant investment funds started to emerge in 
commercial banks. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, in fact, was the first to 
enter the mutual fund field.47 The national bank of Saudi Arabia, currently 
called NCB Capital Co., founded the first mutual fund in December 1979.48 
However, mutual fund regulations were not issued until the beginning of 
1993.49 By the end of 1998, the number of investment funds reached 114.50 
To date, Saudi Arabia is considered the largest market for mutual funds in 
terms of market share,51 representing SR 290,141.10 million (equivalent to 
approximately $77 billion in U.S. Dollars). 
 
Image from Capital Market Authority of The Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia Annual Report 2018. 
The Capital Market Law authorizes the Capital Market Authority to 
regulate the activities taken by investment funds, portfolio managers, and 
 
 47 Mutual Funds, CAP. MKT. AUTH. OF THE KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA 2, https:// 
cma.org.sa/en/Awareness/Publications/booklets/Booklet_3.pdf. 
 48 Id. 
 49 Id. 
 50 Mohammad M. Hariri, Sharia Compliant investment funds in Saudi Arabia-A Critical 
Perspective, 32 (2013) (unpublished D.Sc. dissertation, University of Dundee) (on file with 
the University of Dundee Library). 
 51 Id. 
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fund advisors.52 The Capital Market Law requires the CMA set forth 
regulations, rules, and instructions that govern the structure and operation 
of investment funds. The regulatory framework for investment funds has 
significantly developed since its first enactment.53 The approach taken by 
the Capital Market Authority, the body which regulates capital markets 
activities in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, is both risk-based and 
compliance-based.54 Nonetheless, more transparency and procedural 
improvements are needed to provide a more proper regulatory scheme for 
the CMA and the industry. 
In order to better assess the procedure, one needs to understand that 
the CMA was given rule-making authority and enforcement power by 
authority of the Kingdom to protect investors, reduce systemic risk, ensure 
fair and efficient trading, and transparency of the capital markets.55 In that 
sense, the principles behind the Investment Fund Regulation enacted by the 
CMA is analogous to that of the Investment Company Act of 1940. 
 
Restriction on Borrowing 
The Investment Fund Regulations has two provisions which 
specifically discuss borrowing. Under Article 40(h), the borrowing of a 
public fund must not exceed 10% of its net asset value. Providing the 
primary objective is to protect investors and promote a more transparent 
environment for investors, this limitation seems to be effective. However, 
this limitation is in need of refinement. 
The problem presented with this limitation is that the provision did not 
provide a coverage requirement for such borrowing. 
Under a booming economy, leverage investing allows investors to 
magnify their return. This can be shown by a simple calculation: suppose an 
investor owns $100 and borrows $50. Under an economic boom, an 
investor is able to obtain 10% of the return. The investor will receive a 
return of $165 with leverage compared to only $110 without leverage. 
However, if the mutual fund falls, the investor will lose twice as much with 
leverage. Existing laws do not offer any protection to the investor. 
The Investment Fund Regulations provide no clear liquidity 
requirement. While the Regulation requires all money market funds to 
 
 52 See CAPITAL MARKET LAW, CAP. MKT. AUTH. 16, https://cma.org.sa/en/Rules 
Regulations/CMALaw/Documents/CMALaw.pdf. 
 53 See IMF, SAUDI ARABIA: FINANCIAL SECTOR ASSESSMENT PROGRAM UPDATE–
DETAILED ASSESSMENT OF OBSERVANCE OF THE IOSCO OBJECTIVES AND PRINCIPLES OF 
SECURITIES REGULATION 9 (2011). 
 54 Id. 
 55 See Capital Market Authority, CAP. MKT. AUTH., https://cma.org.sa/en/AboutCMA/
Pages/AboutCMA.aspx (last visited Sept. 21, 2020). 
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ensure liquidity equaling to at least 10% of the fund’s net asset,56 such 
requirement is not applicable to all open-end funds. The Regulation did 
require fund managers use their best efforts to ensure that the investment 
fund is sufficiently liquid in order to meet anticipated redemption requests; 
it did not provide a uniform standard. 
Without a coverage threshold, a fund manager lacks the information to 
properly assess the risk of borrowing. As previously discussed, with a 
coverage test requirement, a fund is able to maintain the value of assets 
compared to the value of the loan. In case of an economic downturn, a fund 
may be forced to sell its assets to meet the portfolio coverage requirement. 
With such, a lot of American mutual funds will choose not to borrow. 
Similarly, the CMA should adopt more transparent and clear guidance that 
assists Saudi open-end funds to better assess the risk and the need for 
borrowing. 
Another provision concerning borrowing is Article 64. This provision 
requires a fund manager to use his or her best effort to retain sufficient 
liquidity to meet redemption requests. If the manager finds that, for the 
benefit of the fund, the money available in the fund is insufficient to meet 
redemption requests, the manager may borrow. Borrowing to meet 
redemption requests, however, is not subject to the 10% limit set out in 
Article 40(h).57 This provision directly conflicts with the purpose of 
enactment of Article 40(h). More severely, it is contradictory to the 
principles behind the whole Investment Fund Regulations. 
An authority restricts public funds from borrowing to protect 
investors’ interest and prevent potential market crashes. Such prohibition 
requires the fund manager to actively monitor the liquidity of a fund and 
sell or purchase assets as needed. As such, it imposes a limit on the level of 
risk a fund is able to take, which in turn ensure market stability and investor 
confidence. However, this cannot be achieved if fund managers are able to 
borrow from banks to meet redemption requests. 
Article 64 serves as a safe harbor for investment fund managers. This 
creates the potential for them to exploit their very own responsibility as 
fund managers. First, they do not need to continuously monitor liquidity to 
ensure adherence to the background principles of the Regulations. Second, 
they are able to borrow and there is no limit on the borrowing, which opens 
the door for them to be more reluctant in their investment decisions. Third, 
and the most important point, shareholders who redeem faster than others 
during an economic downturn are benefiting at the expense of the 
remaining shareholders. Shareholders who remain in the fund end up facing 
lower assets but higher debt. 
 
 56 Investment Funds Regulation, CAP. MKT. AUTH. 30 (2006), https://cma.org.sa/en/ 
RulesRegulations/Regulations/Documents/IFRs%20Regulations-%20Final%20English.pdf. 
 57 Id. at 37. 
 




In light of Article 40(h) and Article 64(b) and (c), it appears that Saudi 
Arabia does not have a concrete concept for fund borrowing. Its approach is 
deficient because it opens the gate for potential abuses and does not offer 
safe protection for investors. In addition to the current 10% borrowing 
limit, the CMA needs to impose a definite liquidity requirement. As the 
exact number for coverage requirement demands extensive numerical 
analysis and market research, it is thus not within the scope of this article. 
Nonetheless, the CMA should consider the U.S. approach of requiring an 
asset coverage requirement of 300%. While one may argue that the 10% 
limit in Article 40(h), by itself, functions as an asset coverage requirement, 
Article 64(c) provides backdoor access to circumvent this coverage 
requirement. To provide a better understanding and clear regulatory 
framework for fund managers, the two provisions, Articles 40(h) and 64(c), 
concerning borrowing should be viewed in conjunction with each other, 
such that an asset coverage requirement, if legislated, can be applicable to 
both borrowing to invest and borrowing to meet redemption requests. 
Power of the Authority to Remove and Replace the Fund Manager/Fund 
Board in a Public Fund 
Similar to the U.S. Investment Companies Act of 1940, the Investment 
Fund Regulation in Saudi Arabia provides tremendous power and authority 
to the CMA. Distinct from other regulatory frameworks, the Regulations 
provide the CMA the power to remove and replace public fund managers.58 
 
 58  
Article 20: Power of the Authority to Remove and Replace Fund Manager. 
Investment Fund Regulations of The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The Article 
provides: 
 a. The Authority shall have the power to remove a fund manager in relation to a 
particular investment fund and to take any action it deems appropriate to appoint a 
replacement fund manager for that investment fund or to take any other measures 
it deems necessary in the event of: 
  1) the fund manager ceasing to carry on management activities without 
notification to the Authority under the Authorised Persons Regulations; 
  2) the cancellation by the Authority of the fund manager’s relevant 
authorisation(s) to carry on management activities under the Authorised 
Persons Regulations; 
  3) a request by the fund manager to the Authority to cancel its relevant 
authorisation to carry on management activities; 
  4) the Authority believing that the fund manager has failed, in a manner 
which the Authority considers material, to comply with the Capital Market 
Law or its Implementing Regulations; 
  5) the death, incapacity or resignation of a portfolio manager who manages 
the assets of the relevant investment fund, if no other registered person 
employed by the fund manager can manage the assets of the relevant 
investment fund or the assets of the funds managed by the portfolio manager; 
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One may argue the Saudi investment fund industry is still in its youth, thus 
more authoritative monitoring is necessary to ensure its healthy 
development. However, this provision provides excess authority to the 
CMA without giving concrete guidance to investment fund managers. 
First, under subparagraph 4 of paragraph a, the authority can remove a 
manager from his or her position as long as the authority holds a belief that 
the manager fails to comply with associated laws in a manner that the 
authority considers material. 
This provision provides two considerations for removal. One, the 
manager fails under the authority’s belief; two, the failure is material, under 
the authority’s belief. While failure and material seem easy to understand, a 
clear interpretation is urgently needed. The Regulation also falls short of 
enforcing a concrete standard outlining the “authority’s belief.” Without 
such a standard, an investment fund manager will be constrained in 
performing his duties in fear of crossing the line of the authority’s beliefs. 
The absence of concrete definitions also leads to transparency issues. 
As there is no standard or definition, it provides great leeway for the 
Authority in their judgments. The provision not only opens the gate for 
preferential treatments, but it also gives rise to potential bribery. A fund 
manager can be easily removed by the authority for reasons completely 
irrelevant to a material failure to comply, but simply due to personal 
conflict with the authority officials. Once fluidity exists in defining material 
failure in the authority’s belief, a lot can be done by the fund manager in 
private to obtain a more favorable interpretation. This runs afoul of the 
principles behind enactment. 
A regulation is effective when it imposes a uniform standard on all 
participants in the industry. The legislation can then observe and obtain 
feedback over the years from the market. Legislators then draft 
amendments in accordance with the feedbacks and observations. These 
cannot be achieved if a regulation merely functions as a display. Not only 
does it prevent governing bodies from making improvements, but it also 
 
  6) Issuance of a special fund resolution by unitholders of a close ended fund; 
or 
  7) any other event determined by the Authority on reasonable grounds to be 
of sufficient material. 
 b. Notice of any event described in sub-paragraph (5) of paragraph (a) of this 
Article shall be provided by the fund manager to the Authority within (2) days of 
its occurrence. 
 c. If the Authority exercises its power pursuant to paragraph (a) of this Article, 
the relevant fund manager shall co-operate fully in order to help facilitate a smooth 
transfer of responsibilities to the replacement fund manager during the initial (45) 
day period after the appointment of the replacement fund manager. The fund 
manager shall where necessary and applicable and at the discretion of the 
Authority, novate all of the contracts relating to the relevant investment fund to 
which it is a party to the replacement fund manager. 
Id. at 13-14. 
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threatens the public interest which the Regulation aims to protect. As a 
result, investors will lose confidence in investing in the market. 
Ensuring investor confidence is especially crucial to the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia as it has the vision of transforming the Kingdom into a global 
investment powerhouse.59 The fact that the market is relatively new is 
already holding back some investors. If the Kingdom cannot provide 
adequate protection to investors, the Kingdom not only will run the risk of 
capital outflows but will also encounter difficulty in attracting inflow of 
foreign capital. 
The Kingdom is currently only open to foreign institutional investors. 
Institutional investors who will have the capital to venture into the Saudi 
market are experienced financial players in mature markets. Their 
expectations of regulatory safeguards will be critical. Any attempt to sketch 
thorough guidance and an inclusive definition for “material” that qualifies 
“authority’s belief” under the Regulation is outside the scope of this article. 
It is also best to leave the task to the CMA, as it retains the best 
understanding of the Kingdom’s interest. Nonetheless, a suggestion for the 
governing bodies in the Kingdom: in order to reassure investors and gain 
their confidence, an amendment for a transparent and comprehensive 
regulatory provision is critical. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In light of Section 2(a)(19)(A)(vii) from the Investment Company Act 
of 1940 and Article 20(a)(4), both regulatory bodies do not have 
comprehensive understandings of “material.” The U.S. interpretation of 
“material” in the independent director context has proven to be both 
overinclusive and underinclusive. Nonetheless, the Capital Market 
Authority should refer to the Investment Company Act of 1940 when 
addressing the issue raised with borrowing under the Regulation. 
 
 59  
 The first pillar of our vision is our status as the heart of the Arab and Islamic 
worlds. We recognize that Allah the Almighty has bestowed on our lands a gift 
more precious than oil. Our Kingdom is the Land of the Two Holy Mosques, the 
most sacred sites on earth, and the direction of the Kaaba (Qibla) to which more 
than a billion Muslims turn at prayer. 
The second pillar of our vision is our determination to become a global investment 
powerhouse. Our nation holds strong investment capabilities, which we will 
harness to stimulate our economy and diversify our revenues. 
The third pillar is transforming our unique strategic location into a global hub 
connecting three continents, Asia, Europe and Africa. Our geographic position 
between key global waterways, makes the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia an epicenter 
of trade and the gateway to the world. 
Message From HRH Prince Mohammed Bin Salman Abdulaziz Al-Saud, VISION KINGDOM 
OF SAUDI ARABIA 2030, https://vision2030.gov.sa/en/vision/crown-message (last visited 
Sept. 21, 2020). 
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Multiple regulatory frameworks have attempted to provide more clear 
understandings of “material.” Nonetheless, this remains a complicated task 
even in mature financial markets like the United States. Saudi Arabia, in 
endeavoring to refine its regulation, should examine the deficit in the U.S. 
system. It should examine the SEC’S failures and consider 
recommendations provided to the SEC to address the failures. By doing so, 
the CMA can avoid creating ambiguities and loopholes. It can also ensure it 
avoids mistakes made by mature markets in the past. With a more mature 
financial regulatory scheme, the Kingdom will further stimulate economic 
growth and attract quality foreign capital. 
